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           Islam is immanent to and constitutive of France, and yet Muslim French must still claim 
and justify their belonging in the context of widespread public skepticism over Islam’s 
compatibility with ‘French’ social and cultural value. While many urban French college students 
in particular have grown up in a time of de-facto racial pluralism, they have also grown up in the 
aftermath of events such as 9/11, the 2004 hijab ban and the 2011 burka ban, all of which have 
played significant roles in dominant French discourses on Islam and laïcité. Therefore, how have 
these students been shaped by contemporary French discourses and understandings of laïcité? 
While there is much literature on post-colonial France and Muslims within this context, there is a 
lack of scholarly research on French college students in particular and their understandings of 
Muslims in France. In this exploratory ethnographic study, I argue that students on both the left 
and right sides of the political spectrum still reiterate opinions that fit within the dominant French 
discourse surrounding Muslims in France. This in turn perpetuates the racialization of Islam within 
the framework of French republicanism.  
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1.0 Introduction 
It’s a sunny day in May 2018 and I am walking in the 9th arrondissement, listening to my 
music and thinking of what I’m going to make for dinner in my foyer. As I round the corner to 
pass the Tuileries garden, I notice a large group of men wearing all black gathering by the entrance. 
They have armbands and are holding large signs which are too far away for me to read. I start to 
walk faster as I notice the hordes of policemen gathering around the garden, all of them standing 
near the protestors. When I return home, I realize that I was walking near the Paris Opera one day 
after an attack there, where a man had stabbed and killed one and injured four others. This man, 
who had been claimed by ISIS and was yelling “Allahu Akbar”, was presumed to be a terrorist. 
Immediately after the event, people assumed that the attacker was of Arab-descent, but later on, it 
was discovered that he was Chechen (New York Times 2018). Although this attack occurred in 
France, it fits into the wider global trend of stereotyping and scapegoating Maghrebi Muslim 
populations. 
As stated by George Morgan and several other scholars in Global Islamophobia: Muslims 
and Moral Panic in the West, Global Islamophobia has taken root in the West, specifically 
affecting the liberal democratic state and its ability to manage immigration and cultural difference 
(2012, 1). The way in which I utilize the term Islamophobia throughout my paper recognizes it as 
not only encompassing discrimination against Muslims, but also as a specific form of prejudice 
“that is reliant on identity abstraction that not only generalizes, but racializes a plethora of different 
individuals who may have nothing in common apart from their Muslim identities, into the singular 
and negatively predefined ‘Muslim Race’” (Osman 2017). Globally, Muslims are not solely 
discriminated against based on their religion, but on the historical and current cultural assumptions 
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that are seen as an inextricable part of the wider Muslim community. The root of burgeoning 
Islamophobia is connected to geopolitical shifts with the Muslim world becoming a global enemy, 
from the Islamic revolution in Iran, to the first and second Gulf war, the war in Afghanistan and 
everything that followed. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the declaration of the war on terror, 
Muslims were and still are demonized and used as a scapegoat for larger global problems across 
the Western hemisphere. Islamophobic attitudes as amplified by the previously stated events is not 
solely contained to the Western hemisphere and in fact, Islamophobia is also common in Asia and 
is rooted in Asia’s historical context of its colonial experience (Osman 2017). Furthermore, in 
Asia, “the rise of religious nationalism in many parts of the region can also explain the rising anti-
Muslim feelings as seen from the cases of India and Myanmar which has seen a recent rise in anti-
Muslim violence” (Osman 2017). While global attitudes towards Muslims may derive from 
different origins, they employ quite often similar languages and result in similar discrimination.  
Additionally, more recently mass media’s wide and detailed coverage of mainly Muslim 
refugees’ journeys into Western Europe has led some to believe that there is currently a refugee 
“crisis.” This in turn has led to the demonization by the media of Muslim populations, whether 
established since generations, or recent immigrants or refugees. In fact, “this demonization 
conflates particular cultural forms with disregard for the law and enmity towards the nation” 
(Morgan 2016, 2). Through this process, Muslim populations in Europe are seen as culturally 
incompatible with secular, liberal Western society. The culturalist discourses about the very 
heterogeneous Muslim populations in Europe in combination with concerns over economic 
stability has ultimately led to the stigmatization of Muslim minority populations. In previous times 
of economic instability, Muslim populations were targeted as “alien” populations that threatened 
social cohesion. In the 1980s specifically, with the rise of neoliberalism, the focus shifted from 
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Muslim immigrants’ social problems to their “problematic” culture culminating in the shift from 
economic to cultural burden. This process resulted in the racialization of Muslim populations who 
are consistently associated with specific inherent cultural norms (Yilmaz 2016).  
Furthermore, the recent spectacular rise of far-right populist groups has further fueled the 
fire and in fact, “the combination of the Paris bombings and the flight of refugees has offered a 
marvelous opportunity to the xenophobic right to expand its power” (Harris 2016). While the far-
right has played a part in the rising rates of xenophobia, it is necessary to mention that both center 
and left parties have engaged in rhetoric that negatively affects how Muslims are viewed. 
While increasing Islamophobia can possibly be tied to the failings of neoliberal policies, 
and the particular political cultures it enables (Yilmaz 2016), there is strong evidence to suggest 
that Islamophobia is playing out differently in various contexts. Therefore, how does Islamophobia 
manifest itself in these different national contexts? To what extent are the ways in which these 
developments are framed different in Europe to other places, such as the United States?  The 
treatment of Muslims in the United States is greatly affected by its relatively distant geographic 
location— as opposed to European countries, which received the majority of Muslim immigrants 
from closer-by regions of the Middle East and North Africa with whom they often had historical 
connections, especially through colonialism. Furthermore, the way in which the United States 
treats its minority populations is founded in the idea of multiculturalism, which allows for cultural 
difference within the public sphere, a right that is actively practice by various communities around 
the United States (Casanova 2013). In comparison, many European countries have different 
national models of integration, which, together with their often colonial histories, impacts the 
treatment of Muslim minorities. To understand how Islamophobia manifests itself in different 
contexts, I will focus on the case of France because of its ostensibly unique way of configuring 
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these issues. To further understand my research questions, I will explore the particular case of 
French college students studying for university degrees in Paris and in the United States. 
Specifically, I want to know what self-identifying non-Muslim French students think of French 
Muslims and why. 
 Within France, the treatment and attitudes toward the Muslim population has developed 
within its own socio-political and historical context. To understand how Muslim populations have 
become “othered” in France, it is necessary to examine France’s colonial legacy, which is the 
beginning of France’s long and complicated history with its Muslim population. France colonized 
many countries in Western and Northern Africa in the 19th century, most notably Algeria, which 
was not merely a colony but became a French department. During this time, while trying to impose 
its republican values to various degrees, all the while especially concerned with extracting 
resources on its colonies and departments, France constructed a system in which certain cultural 
features were seen as compatible or incompatible with the French state, with incompatible 
practices seen as more “tribal” (Silverstein 2004, 40). These “tribal” practices were often 
associated with Islam. The idea that certain ways of being are incompatible with the French state 
continued as North Africans migrated to France at exponential rates, especially after Algerian 
Independence in 1962.  
While assimilation remained the aim of the French state, Islam still seemed incompatible 
with French culture as it was perceived to counter republican ideals such as secularism which 
includes the privatization of religion. Secularism, interestingly, is claimed simultaneously to be a 
product of Christian-Western European history and an allegedly universal principle (Scott 2007, 
94). The idea of secularism as modernism coincides with broader transnational processes in which 
many countries are becoming increasingly secular, insisting not only on the separation of church 
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and state but also on the privatization of religious identities, in order to become a fully modern 
nation-state.  
The idea that one must be secular in order to be a modern French citizen has widely affected 
Muslims in France. France’s history with secularism began with the laïcité law of 1905, which 
established the separation of church and state. This law was originally created to act against the 
immense power of the Catholic church in France (Kelly 2017, 111). Eventually, the emergence of 
new Islamic identities among France’s post-colonial minorities led to the reworking of the 
historical notion of laïcité (Kelly 2017, 4). The re-articulations of laïcité in the last three decades 
have primarily impacted the Muslim population in France. This has manifested itself through 
various laws, including the 2004 “headscarf ban” a colloquial term for a law, “en application du 
principe de laïcité, le portes de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appurtenance religieuse dans 
les écoles, collèges et lycées publics,” (Kheir 2008), which prevents Muslim women from wearing 
hijabs in public schools. The concept of laïcité was initially founded on the idea of limiting the 
Catholic Church’s power and privatizing religious identities, but the meaning of laïcité has evolved 
over time. Therefore, what are the particular French articulations of Islamophobia and how do non-
Muslim urban French college students’ understanding of laïcité reiterate or counter these trends? 
To further understand my research questions, I focus on the particular case of French 
college students in Paris and the United States. How have young students been shaped by 
contemporary French discourses and understandings of laïcité? French college students in 
particular have grown up and gone to school in a primarily post-2004 context, where they may 
have seen their Muslim classmates on a daily level forced to unveil in public school. Not only did 
the discursive context in France focus on Muslims in terms of challenges to laïcité, but current 
French college students also grew up in a post 9/11 context, which further affects their unconscious 
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and conscious beliefs about Muslims. On the other hand, college students are of an age where they 
can be assumed, at least in urban settings, to have grown up in an environment of de facto racial 
and religious pluralism. Nonetheless, college students are in no way a uniform body in regards to 
their views and political opinions. Despite this, my study aims to cover a range of views that can 
be found amongst French college students who come from every part of the political spectrum. 
While this participant pool is too small to be representative of all French students, they can provide 
valuable insights into what current students think of these issues.  
My research will provide insight into how French college students’ views align with 
dominant French understandings of laïcité and Muslims in France. To fully explain my 
interlocutors’ approaches and opinions, the body of my paper will be divided into three sections. I 
will first discuss my methods and theoretical framework in which my research is based and situate 
my study within the larger context of laïcité and Muslims in France. Then, after discussing my 
research methods, I will begin my empirical analysis, which consists of five core chapters or 
sections. First, I discuss French students’ thoughts on French identity and the “Self.” This section 
will allow me to explain how French students’ define French identity in the contemporary context. 
The following sections discuss Muslims identity within the French context, assimilation, Muslim 
women and the hijab, and students’ perspectives on the banlieues. These sections provide insight 
into how French students’ understand the practical application of laïcité in a multicultural society. 
Ultimately, throughout the body of this paper I will use thematic analysis to uncover French 
students’ opinions on laïcité and how this relates to their views on the French Muslim population. 
Although my empirical data is limited in number and geographic location, I have already 
been able to observe interesting and relevant recurring themes that offer promising material for 
further research. I believe that, in general, urban French students’ views are, in fact, more 
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consistent with the general French understanding of Muslims and laïcité. It is important to note 
that while there is some uniformity with dominant French thought, there is variance within the 
studied population. While I do not have enough information to generalize to any wider population, 
I consider that my small ethnographic study will offer valuable insight into the power of the French 
narrative and cultural history that is so proudly taught in all French schools. Although I am 
researching a younger generation and younger generations tend to think more liberally than their 
predecessors, as we tend to think in the United States, I argue that some concepts may be so 
culturally ingrained that it makes it often difficult for young students to critically deconstruct the 
norm. This can ultimately impact how we understand the influence of social and religious cultural 
norms, traditions, and histories on younger populations within France. Ultimately, often in spite 
of claiming to be anti-racist, these cultural norms undermine the capacity of some of these young, 
well-meaning students to become aware of racializing narratives in their own understandings of 
difference.  
1.1 Theoretical Framework 
Although I gave a brief overview of France’s colonial history in order to frame my research, 
it is important to detail the work that has been published surrounding Muslims in France and where 
my research stands in relation to these important works.  
A large body of scholarship has discussed the way in which French republicanism shapes 
current French discourse and policies, ultimately effecting the outward perception of those who 
potentially go “against” these values. In the case of France, it is common for French citizens to 
emphasize the necessity of a laïque or secular society, one which stays in line with the ideals of 
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the 5th Republic. For understanding differing subjectivities of Muslim and Black African 
immigrants and their descendants, Silverstein (2018), Scott (2007) and Parekh (2008) all examine 
how immigrants are often perceived to be subjects who bring their fundamentally different 
religious and cultural values— which are seen as incompatible— to France, and that this cultural 
difference prevents full and necessary assimilation.  This viewpoint held by some French citizens 
is not necessarily seen as problematic or offensive, as it emphasizes the importance of assimilation 
in order to obtain equality between all citizens. The understanding that equality can only be 
realized through the privatization of any visible difference is a central feature of French republican 
discourse. Most importantly, this concept emphasizes that France will finally become politically 
unified when individuals leave behind or compartmentalize their culture or religion in order to 
fully integrate into French society (Parekh 2008; Fernando 2014). Fernando (2014) and Bowen 
(2012) further examine how Muslim migrants are perceived in the French public sphere through 
the lens of secularism and race, both authors showing the impacts of the racialization of Muslim 
populations within a “secular” France. Ultimately, French citizens whose practices fall outside the 
“norm” for French republicanism, including those who express their religion publically, are seen 
as disrupting the political and social unification of France. Immigrant Muslim populations and 
specifically Muslim women who veil have been largely the target of this widespread viewpoint.  
In France, the various threats to laïcité have been redefined from the extremely powerful 
Catholic church to a religious and racial minority, ultimately targeting the Muslim community who 
are seen as a population which refuses to integrate into wider French society. Modern-day 
secularism in France is often invoked in cases of the hijab, the niqab, or other outwardly religious 
displays by Muslims, which are seen as in opposition to French republicanism (Wolfreys 2017). 
Since the hijab had been discursively constructed into a nationwide problem, Muslim women have 
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been the main target of political parties who seek to use laïcité as a uniting political tool. There 
has been much literature written about Muslim women in France (Scott 2007; Jouili 2015; 
Fernando 2014; Bowen 2007), especially after the Hijab ban in 2004 which caused much 
international controversy. Often times, while the assumption is that the hijab is an oppressive tool 
that restricts Muslim women’s freedom, academic literature has uncovered a more nuanced 
picture. Scott, Jouili, and Bowen analyze the issue of the hijab by showing the complexities of 
feminist discourse and Muslim subjectivities. In Fadil’s work Not-Veiling as an body practice, she 
discusses that many Muslim women have an immense self-discipline to dress modestly. Many of 
the women in Fadil’s study also understand that while there is a religious obligation to wear the 
hijab, it is freeing when they choose to wear it of their own personal conviction (2011). Jeanette 
Jouili (2015) analyzes a similar topic with Muslim women in France and Germany, through the 
lens of religious subjectivities and their complexities. The women in Jouili’s study state that it is 
difficult for some women to choose to veil or dress modestly, but they continue to do so because 
of their strongly held personal convictions. In both of these studies, it becomes clear that the choice 
to veil is nuanced, but this often goes ignored when tackling the issue of the hijab in the wider 
context of French policy. The complexity of subjective religious identities is pertinent to my own 
research as, often times, the varying religious identities of Muslims go ignored by my interlocutors. 
This will become relevant when analyzing the opinions of my interviewees later on and how much 
they take into account first-hand narratives of the French Muslim population.  
Ultimately, I was not able to find any studies about how French college students understand 
laïcité as well as France’s Muslim population. I was only able to find one short work that talks 
about how laïcité is understood by university students and faculty. This study was conducted at a 
French International Relations Institute (ILERI) by David Vauclair (2017). This is the only other 
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ethnographic work that I could discover which details how French college students and other 
university staff comprehend laïcité as a concept. This study is similar to mine as it was small in 
size with only 13 participants, 9 of them being students at the university. Ultimately, Vauclair 
found that while the participants regarded laïcité as a concept with varying meanings and 
definitions, most students thought of it in a positive manner and as “one of the core elements of 
French collective life” (154). Furthermore, only one interviewee, who was Franco-American, 
thought of French laïcité as problematic and restrictive while most others perceived laïcité as 
necessary for social harmony. In his conclusion, Vauclair mentions Foucault's 1970 idea of forging 
the notion of an “epistemic community,” a group that shares common symbols, references, and 
intentions. Vauclair describes his participants as an epistemic community because laïcité is used 
as a common thread by his interviewees to forge a “common understanding of...the limits of 
tolerance and the place of religion in a society” (156). It becomes clear that, as in Vauclair’s work, 
there are common objectives and shared experiences amongst my participants because of their age 
group and relative shared economic background. My work goes slightly further than Vauclair’s in 
terms of more varied thematic questions and analysis.   
Ultimately, Vauclair’s usage of epistemic communities frames how I will approach the 
analysis of my interviewees in the following chapters. Fadil, Jouili, Fernando, Silverstein, and 
Scott’s works will also provide the context and framework for the forthcoming analysis, 
specifically in regards to understanding subjective identities of Muslim populations as well as the 
racialization of Islam in French discourse and how this is understood by my interlocutors.  
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1.2 Methods 
To see if this topic was further worth exploring, I conducted an exploratory ethnographic 
study with 11 French students, all either studying in Paris or at the University of Pittsburgh in the 
United States. This study was based at the University of Pittsburgh and was conducted for an 
undergraduate thesis for a Bachelors of Philosophy in International and Area studies. I arrived in 
Paris in January 2018 to study abroad and stayed until the end of July in order to conduct my 
research. While I did not begin my structured and informal interviews until May, the time 
beforehand was spent conducting a literature review and gathering fieldnotes through daily lived 
experience, such as in a shared living environment in a dormitory. This research project was 
conceptualized over a year ago, but the actual fieldwork lasted roughly 5 months. My methods 
consisted primarily of 11 semi-structured interviews and participant observation.  
The sample population for this study was small in size because of my difficulty obtaining 
more interviewees through the method of snowball sampling. Using existing contacts, I messaged 
multiple French students that I could identify through various networks and interviewed those who 
responded. Due to time constraints I modified the snowball sampling strategy by obtaining help 
from a friend named Paul, a French student, studying at a business school outside of Paris. Paul 
provided the names and contact information for other French students on campus with whom he 
had connections. His friends then connected me with other French students who attend different 
universities. Although my sampling frame is small, I believe that I obtained for my study a diverse 
sample of French students, including students of different races, religions, and political beliefs. 
This study involved 11 students who participated in semi-structured interviews and over 
20 people I spent time with for participant observation. The only requirements for the participants 
were that they hold French citizenship and are between the ages of 18 and 27. I did not aim to 
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obtain only non-Muslim students, but all of my interlocutors self-identified as non-Muslim. I chose 
the age range of 18-27 to ensure that I specifically obtained information about young French 
students. All of the participants were studying in either Paris or at the University of Pittsburgh and 
came from a relatively similar middle to upper-middle class economic background. My own 
identity as a young person studying for a university degree positions me somehow as an in-group 
member to my interlocutors, but also an out-group member, because I am not French. Specifically, 
as an in-group member, I felt as though my interlocutors were more comfortable discussing certain 
issues that may have been harder to discuss with an older researcher. As an out-group member, I 
felt that my status as an American inhibited discussions, as there may have been an assumption 
that I was ignorant about French history and culture. This study is limited by “desirability bias” as 
my status as a fellow student may have influenced the topics brought up by students. 
It is also important to mention that the students in France are all undergraduates, while the 
French participants in Pittsburgh are graduate students studying the humanities. Their time 
studying in the United States may impact their opinions on laïcité in contrast to the French students 
studying in France, who may not have spent much time outside of the country. Furthermore, I did 
not choose participants based on ethnicity or gender, but my interviewees consisted of six young 
women and five young men. 
During the duration of the five-month study, the interviews were conducted using an 
interview guide that can be found in Appendix A. I asked a variety of questions and obtained 
students’ opinions relating to laïcité, immigration, and far-right actors such as Front National 
politician, Marine Le Pen. Most often I recorded the interviews on my IPhone but did not record 
any names in order to keep the data anonymous. A few times I had to rely on my written notes of 
the interview, such as when the locality was too noisy for my recorder to work properly. For the 
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coding of qualitative data, I used Nvivo, a coding software provided by the University of 
Pittsburgh. Through this program I coded both a priori codes as well as themes that emerged from 
my research.  
 During this time, I was also able to spend time with French students in more casual 
settings, such as at parties and bars. This type of participant observation allowed me to observe 
what topics may be more salient to French students in their day-to-day life. Specifically, I spent 
time with French students at a business school outside of Paris as well in bars and at parties where 
I met other students through mutual friends. Throughout my stay in Paris, I also lived in a 
dormitory with students from all over the world, including many French students. During this time, 
I spent many hours with French students in communal dorm areas, including the kitchen, dining 
room, and gym. I took notes of my participant observations in my notebook or on my computer 
after the experience occurred. My time spent with these students led me to more specific questions 
including, how do French college students understand racial difference in conjunction with 
religious affiliation? 
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2.0 Empirical Analysis  
2.1.1  French Student’s thoughts on French identity 
Although France’s history is rooted in a Catholic past, the relationship that many French 
citizens have with this French-Christian identity varies. Throughout France’s history, Catholicism 
has been an essential part of French culture. Before the 5th Republic, the French government 
consisted of ‘divine’ monarchies, meaning that the French king or queen had the God-given right 
to be the ruler. After the French revolution, certain ideologies began to develop into central tenants 
of French political self-understanding, including secularism, in order to curtail the power of the 
monarchy and its close ties to the Catholic church. The desire for a secular state became most 
evident with the codification of the 1905 laïcité law. This started the process through which 
Catholicism refashioned itself into a cultural staple as opposed to a dominant religion. While 
France takes pride in its secularism, Christian traditions and norms have been transformed into 
taken-for-granted cultural facets of French culture. Therefore, the modern nation-state expresses 
almost a “crypto-Christianity” (Scott 2007, 92). 
I was astonished to discover how important France’s relationship to Christianity was with 
my interlocutors during my group interview, especially after reading so much literature on the 
importance of secularism to the French state. During the group interview, an argument about 
France’s origins and identity emerged after talking about a particular incident in the West of 
France. In 2014, the small town of La-Roche-sur-Yon (in Pays de la Loire) installed a nativity 
scene on the public property of their town hall. The nativity scene was quickly banned by a local 
court after the secular campaign group, Fédération Nationale de la Libre Pensée, complained 
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about the scene. Other small towns faced similar problems regarding their nativity scenes which 
were located on public property. Ultimately, there were widespread debates among citizens who 
supported the secular protests and others who argued that secularism, in this scenario, was being 
taken too far (Dunham 2014).  
When I conducted a group interview at a business school outside of Paris in summer of 
2018, I was able to discuss this topic extensively. During this interview, I was joined by four 
friends in my seed informant’s apartment. At the table, I sat between my friend from high school, 
Paul, and another rather boy, Thomas, who was rather timidly sitting next to me. Across from me 
at the table were two girls, Christine and Ariane, wide-eyed and seemingly excited to start the 
interview. Both Paul and Thomas are white French, and did not say they were particularly 
religious. In contrast, Christine is of French and Vietnamese background and Ariane’s father is 
from Northern Africa, but Ariane does not identify as Muslim. Although I interviewed the group 
interviewees four years after the nativity scene controversy, the topic was brought up early in our 
interview, specifically when we began our conversation about La-Roche-Sur-Yon. Christine, with 
dark hair and a friendly, engaging demeanor chimed in first, bringing up the nativity scene scandal, 
mentioning that not everybody was upset and that the small controversy is related to France’s 
interconnectedness with Christianity. She goes on to say: 
 
“Nobody's Christian in my family, but we still celebrate Christmas 
and Easter and stuff like that. It’s just ingrained in the French culture 
in some way. My mom’s not even French to begin with, she moved 
to France when she was seven, she’s Vietnamese. So, that really 
wasn’t her culture to start with, but all the holidays are based 
on...they still happen around all the Christian religious days like 
Toussaint, All saints, Christmas (end of the year)…and then there is 
Easter. So, there are many things that revolve around it and it’s hard 




As Christine understands it, despite the fact that her family is not Christian, she still 
celebrates Christian holidays. Four of my interviewees share a similar sentiment with Christine, 
saying that they or their family are not religious, but they still often celebrate Christian holidays, 
especially because they are seen as cultural facets. This shows how Christianity has become a 
cultural staple of France, in contrast to religions like Judaism or Islam, which are not considered 
to be part of the cultural landscape. France in general is known as a secular country and many of 
its inhabitants are proud of their personal atheism. Despite this, the prevalence of Christianity can 
be observed virtually everywhere. The way religion is perceived in France has affected every 
religion differently, with Christianity understood as a cultural norm and others, such as Islam, seen 
as imposing religion in a way that challenges laïcité.  
Before the passing of the 1905 laïcité law, Christianity was a powerful establishment that 
informed French culture. In fact, as Talal Asad states, common European understanding of the key 
influences shaping modern-day Europe in general, generally evokes the Roman Empire, 
Christianity, the Enlightenment, and industrialization (2002). Therefore, Christianity not only had 
a large effect on French, but on broader European self-understandings. The powerful narrative that 
France is now a very secular nation often comes into conflict with France’s proclaimed Christian 
history. In the group interview, Thomas in particular was quick to interject his opinion on the true 
origins of France as a nation. He stated: 
 
“About the whole Christianity in France, in France we can say that 
France was actually born when Claudius was baptized. So the roots 
of France, it’s a Christian thing.” 
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Later in the interview Thomas states, Nos ancetres sont les Gaulois, which means ‘Our 
ancestors are the Gaulois’, another saying that clarifies French origins and dates French roots back 
to the Gaulois tribe. While he may have said this a bit ironically, this statement has a particular 
history. Both of these statements exemplify one narrative on the nature of French origins, which 
places French identity in the context of Christianity and a long history dating back to the Gaulois 
(5th c. BC- 5th c. AD). This understanding of French origins thus excludes other possible 
formations of French identity. The point made by Thomas was immediately rebuked by Ariane 
who sat across the table with dark curly hair and one leg casually up on her chair. She argued that 
there is a difference between the kingdom of France and the Republic of France, which means that 
the “real” France was not created until 1789. She clarifies: 
 
“I don’t believe in France. I do believe in the 5th Republic. To me, 
it’s France. France is an abstract notion. The political regime of 
France is a reality. It is the 5th Republic.” 
 
Ariane is making clear that she believes that the only France which matters today is the 
French Republic as opposed to the French monarchy or the history of the Gaulois. This point is 
then contested by Christine who argues that a large part of French history is intertwined with 
Christianity, including the Palais de Papes, a palace in Avignon, which housed popes who were 
competing with Rome during the 14th century. While Ariane subsequently acknowledged that 
France’s Christian history is undeniable, she believes that the current nation hasn’t been built on 
Christianity, but on a specific political system that inscribes the law of laïcité.   
The issue that this argument reveals is part of a wider tension between French 
republicanism, which encompasses the concepts of universalism and secularism, and French 
Catholicism, which has been so culturally infused that even non-religious people treat Christianity 
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as the norm. Many scholars have noted the prominence of Catholicism in French society (Gray 
2008; Laborde 2008), an institution so powerful that it remains socially relevant even after the 
introduction of laïcité. The tension between modern secularism and France’s Catholic history have 
defined the French Republic’s imperatives to both universalize and particularize (Fernando 2014, 
34). This has become increasingly relevant with the changing demographics of France, where 
immigrants and Muslims are put in a precarious position in a society that promotes universalism, 
yet points out visible difference. Therefore, French identity depends on how one is perceived as 
French by others, which often disproportionately affects immigrant and Muslim populations. In 
fact, “despite a long history of immigration and colonialism, France rarely acknowledges that 
history, invoking its republican ideology to preserve the status quo and promote a monolithic 
version of French identity and history” (Beaman 2017, 6). Republican ideology is therefore used 
to perpetuate a certain idea of what France should look like, which willingly or unwillingly results 
in the ideal of a particular type of French community that cannot include many people of Muslim 
faith.  
Only one of my interviewees, Louise, directly referenced French republicanism and 
specifically the topic of universalism. Louise is a PhD student at the University of Pittsburgh, 
studying French literature, which may inform her logical analysis of universalism, especially in 
regard to its intended application and its present day form in France. Louise is a person of color 
and grew up in the suburbs of Paris, but later moved two hours away during the 2005 race riots. 
When we first met, she greeted me in the lobby of the French and Italian department at the 
University of Pittsburgh and immediately brought me to the kitchen where we could have more 
privacy. She was eager to speak with me, especially as I had given her some of the interview 
questions the night beforehand in order to be able to prepare herself. Although Louise had more 
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time to think about what she wanted to say, and this may have impacted her opinions, I believe 
that our discussion was valuable nonetheless. Towards the beginning of our discussion, we talked 
about how laïcité is understood in France. Louise told me that the original law is taught to children, 
but often its current day application goes ignored. She goes on to clarify what exactly is taught in 
French schools: 
 
“So the text itself. The origins of different republics. French 
republicanism. French universalism. These values and notions are 
taught about. But again, in a more historical sense. So you’re given 
dates, you’re given names and you know that these people have 
influenced or created or really influenced the formation of the 
French Republic based on these notions. That’s the extent of it. It’s 
not as if we were engaging in critical discussion of laïcité and say 
‘ok today, let’s look at the texts, let’s look at the applications of 
laïcité and let’s see what we have to say about these two things.’” 
 
In this quote, Louise reveals one potential cause of the current day tensions that exist in 
deciphering the origins of France. In French schools, which are seen as a pillar of French 
republicanism, the origins of republicanism and universalism are taught extensively. In an 
interview with another French PhD student, Amina, she verified this by stating that the history of 
France and its origins are a huge part of France and its school system. Similar to Louise, I met with 
Amina on the campus of the University of Pittsburgh in the French and Italian department. Amina 
is half-Arab, but was born in the North of France, close to Belgium. Her mom is French and her 
dad is of Moroccan origin, but Amina only speaks French and is only immersed in French culture. 
Amina states that she does not have any relationship with the Moroccan side of her family because 
her grandparents wanted her father to be fully assimilated into French culture. Therefore, she never 
learned Arabic, is not Muslim, and has never been to Morocco. Amina and I sat in the kitchen of 
the department and discussed the way in which French-Christian history has become tied to French 
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identity. While republicanism, secularism, and universalism are taught to be the foundations of 
French society, France’s Christian history constantly comes into conflict with these notions. 
Christianity’s continuing prominence in typically secular locales is seen in my interview with Jean, 
a French white engineering student outside of Paris.  
It was a beautiful sunny day in July when I met with Jean, which influenced our decision 
to sit outside on a picnic bench in the middle of a large, green grassy area. We began our discussion 
by talking about Jean’s understanding of laïcité, which quickly led Jean to the discussion of how 
laïcité is understood on his campus. Jean goes to a top military engineering school outside of Paris, 
where they have about 1,000 students— 500 per class, 20% of whom are female and barely any, 
to his knowledge, who are Muslim. Jean told me that there are a lot of Christian students at his 
school, students who formed an association that organizes Christian events which happen up to 
four times a week. Jean also mentioned that the group had recently organized a debate over the 
question, ‘Is God real?’, which he respects as it opens up a dialogue and shows that this group of 
Christians is “good” and “open-minded.” Despite the existence of this Christian group at his 
school, Jean says that it is often the norm in France to be secular and that many people in France 
do not believe in God anymore.  
Jean’s anecdote about the Christian organization on his campus is not common and none 
of my other interviewees mentioned a similar experience on their campuses. Ultimately, Jean’s 
explanation shows the potential acceptability of Christianity in places that normally remain 
secular. Despite the fact that the original 1905 law predominantly affected Catholic symbolism in 
the public sphere, forcing the removal of crucifixes and prayers from public spaces (Kelly 2017, 
112), Christianity still remains prominent in public places. This becomes evident when looking at 
the crèche (nativity) controversy or other visible expressions of Christianity which have been 
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around for centuries. Christine notes the subtle prominence of Christianity when she lived in the 
South of France where she went to a Catholic high school. More specifically, Christine talks about 
how she didn’t realize the power of Christianity in France until the debates started over the 
legalization of gay marriage in France. She states: 
 
“I remember we had those debates in high school in class where a 
teacher gave us a debate about gay marriage. And I remember some 
of the arguments and I know I am in a Catholic private school but, I 
didn’t think it was so Catholic. You suddenly realize, day-to-day, 
you don’t talk about Catholicism that much or anything, but I 
remember just realizing some of the people in my classes, they were 
not necessarily far-right Catholic or extremely Catholic. Some of 
them didn’t even go to church that much. But, they had an idea of 
defending the true version of a family. It was so foreign to me and I 
think it was a mixture of the culture and the fact that we were in the 
countryside and it was a bit more rural. I remember being like wow.” 
 
Through this anecdote it becomes clear how pervasive Christian norms are in French 
society, even if not all French citizens truly consciously perceive it’s impact. It is also interesting 
to note that despite her shock and discomfort surrounding the gay marriage debates, Christine does 
not frame these religiously-founded arguments within the discursive framework of the laïcité 
debates, which shows how Christianity is debated differently in the public sphere, than, for 
instance Islam. It seems as though many of my interviewees recognize Christianity as a central 
aspect of French culture, but still argue that true French society is founded on a secular public 
sphere. This ultimately puts minority populations and specifically Muslims in a precarious 
position, where they are “hyper visible as Muslims and invisible as French” (Fernando 2014, 69). 
In a later chapter I will discuss further how my informants understand the visibility of Muslim 
populations. 
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When talking about the origins of French roots with my interviewees, while Christianity 
was brought up often, how this excludes other populations was rarely addressed. Only one 
interviewee, Danielle, a French white student who I met with in an airy bright apartment in 
downtown Paris, explicitly mentioned the hypocrisy of allowing Christian symbols to be displayed 
publicly, while other religious symbols are seen as opposing French culture. She specifically states: 
  
“I know that’s quite a contradiction from what I said before on 
public schools, but as the state should not interfere, I was quite 
disturbed. I agree with what you said, you will never see Jewish or 
Muslim symbols on the city hall. To me, there is a huge difference 
between one person having a hijab or a religious sign on them and 
the mayor who has a public role and who represents the state in a 
way, showing that. I know that in France, even people who are not 
religious at all have a crèche in their houses. Just like my boyfriend 
has a huge crèche and nobody’s Christian in his family.” 
 
Danielle was the only interviewee to mention the double standard between how Muslims 
are able to visibly express their religion versus Christians. Most of the other interviewees did not 
express discontent with the prominence of Christianity in French culture, but treated it as a given 
and something unchangeable within French society. Christianity is clearly not something that can 
be left in the past, as its influence can be seen in various public places.  
Overall, it is important to understand the context in which my interviewees situate 
themselves regarding French identity in order to better understand how they perceive others. Most 
of my interviewees recognize that there is an inextricable tie between Christianity and French 
history. Whether they believe this connection is crucial to French identity varies. Furthermore, 
while some interviewees recognized that most French citizens are non-religious, many still 
celebrate Christian holidays. This demonstrates that these French students understand that there is 
some interplay between the Christian cultural aspects of French society and France’s republican 
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ideals. Even more importantly, only Danielle mentions other religions in the discussion about 
French identity, including Judaism and Islam. Danielle recognizes the hypocrisy of the public 
display of Christian religious practices, while other religions are not afforded the same leeway. It 
is important to keep this in mind in the following section, as the students understanding of French 
identity and origins will inform how they understand the French-Muslim population and their place 
in French society.  
2.1.2  Muslim Identity within the French Context 
As mentioned in the introduction, I was in Paris when a man, who was labeled a terrorist, 
killed one person and injured four others near the Opera. The identity of this man was a national 
topic for debate and his nationality came into question almost immediately. This news story was 
brought up early on during my group interview in June, about a month after the attack. The students 
in the group interview discussed how the perpetrator was described across French media, Ariane 
specifically saying that many sources described him as Arab and as an immigrant from Northern 
Africa, when in actuality, she heard that he was Chechen. The automatic assumption that the 
terrorist must have been of North African descent and an immigrant is especially telling and 
exposes powerfully France’s complicated relationship between its colonial past and its current 
national identity.  
Franco-Maghrebis have always been seen as a challenge to French identity because French 
culture is seen as an “unchanging, homogenous entity” (Beaman 2017, 19) and Muslims are a 
challenge to this entity. Increasing marginalization of Muslim populations began when Muslim 
immigrants were recruited to work in factories in France after the Algerian war ended in 1962. 
These workers were primarily discriminated against by the French population for economic 
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reasons as they were believed to be “taking away jobs” from French citizens. As stated in the 
introduction, in the 1980s, the focus shifted from the economic problems of migrants to issues of 
their culture. The entire Muslim population in France was essentialized into one, singular 
“problematic” culture. This widely affects the descendants of first and second generation 
immigrants who are still discriminated against based on their cultural heritage. With the increase 
in visible religious practice among second and third generation French Muslims, there has been 
increasing anxiety in France surrounding the concept of French identity. While some French 
people may argue that this concept is simple rhetoric used by politicians, others internalize a certain 
definition of French identity which impacts how Muslims are viewed by other French citizens. The 
concept of French identity was debated in 2009, when the ministry of Immigration, Integration, 
and National Identity held a debate on National Identity, “comprising a website and series of public 
forums around the country” (Fernando 2011). During this debate, people were able to lament about 
the disintegration of French national identity, an attitude that may be derived from the decline of 
France as an imperial world power as well as immigration from its former colonies (Fernando 
2011). Viewing Muslims as a challenge to French identity is inextricably tied to the history of 
immigration in France. Even if certain Muslim citizens were born in France and have no 
connection to their parents or grandparents’ home country, their differences in religious and 
cultural practices are seen as an undeniable part of French-Muslim populations. If someone is of 
Arab-descent, they may have to continuously prove that they are French or show that they don’t 
identify as Muslim. Their difference is seen as an active agent which will ultimately change French 
culture and French identity.  
Only three of my interviewees talk about question of Muslims being a challenge to French 
identity explicitly, and two of those three argue against the homogenous idea of French identity. 
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Other interviewees talk about immigration and Islam as a subtle way of hinting at French identity 
and what it means to be French.  
During our interview, Ariane recognized that with the growing numbers of Muslims in 
France, there has been increasing anxiety surrounding the roots of French culture. Some of 
Ariane’s opinion may be influenced by her parents as her dad is an immigrant from Northern 
Africa. Ariane is not actively against Muslims in France, but she neutrally reiterates a common 
argument of those who are fearful of Muslim immigration: 
 
“There is also the fact that, for 10 years, the number of Muslims in 
France has gone up and some people are like ‘oh my god, they’re 
invading us. You see they start to appear on the TV and they talk to 
our friends. Sometimes they raise our children. That’s a problem and 
we are losing the roots of our country.’” 
 
In order to explain how some French people react to Muslims in France, Ariane reiterates 
an argument that is commonly used across French media and amongst politicians, most 
prominently Marine Le Pen and the Far Right. In fact, “much of the contemporary nationalist 
response to the perceived existential crisis consists in rallying white constituencies around the 
populist idea that they are the ‘real,’ main root French (Francais de souche), and instructing 
racialized others that, as putative newcomers, they cannot ever truly belong” (Silverstein 2018, 
1130). While most of my informants did not explicitly insist on being the real, “original” French, 
many acknowledge the importance of French history and culture in relation to French identity. 
This way of thinking ultimately has an exclusionary aspect towards those who do not share this 
aspect of French history.  
One interviewee in particular, Helene, was passionate about French culture and made it 
clear that “French culture is losing itself.” I sat down with Helene in a busy, communal area of a 
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business school outside of Paris, the same school where I held the previously mentioned group 
interview. Helene grabbed a chocolate bar from a nearby vending machine and sat next to me at a 
round table, right by some other students who were working on a group project. She was eager to 
speak with me and was also kind enough to switch between French and English in order to explain 
some of her opinions. I was surprised to learn that Helene is a member of the Le Front Nationale, 
the far-right party led by Marine Le Pen. Going into my research, I was not expecting to meet 
someone from the far-right, especially because in the United States, many members of the far-right 
are not necessarily very public about their opinions. I was unsure at first if I could stay objective 
while interviewing Helene, as I disagreed with many of her viewpoints, but ultimately she was 
very willing to share her experiences. In fact, Helene told me that she is active in Le Front 
Nationale and was especially active during the 2017 presidential election. She stuck up posters, 
handed out flyers, handled money for the campaign, and even participated in a think tank about 
the French-speaking world. While Helene became interested in activism at the age of 14, her 
parents, who are more liberal, never approved of her affinity for Le Front Nationale. Helene and I 
spent a lot of time talking about how she understands her French identity, especially in the context 
of increasing immigration to France. As stated before, Helene believes that French culture is being 
lost and that people are no longer proud to be French. In fact, even if you want to wear anything 
“French”, such as a clothing item with a French flag design, people will think you are a right-wing 
extremist. Ultimately, she laments the fact that France hasn’t done anything “impressive” since 
colonialism and World War II and therefore, French people have nothing to be proud of anymore. 
Helene also refers to the case of Maryam Pougetoux, a student union leader who, while speaking 
on television about student reform, became known and then criticized for her hijab. 
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Helene argues that UNEF, a national union of French students (of which Maryam 
Pougetoux is the leader), is fighting against Catholicism. She goes on to say that it seems as though 
more and more people are offended by the cross, but not by the hijab, which is common right-wing 
discourse. Helene also mentions earlier in the interview that the “burka” is in opposition to French 
culture. Although not explicitly stated, Helene hints that the French-Muslim population has 
changed the concept of French identity. 
At the end of our interview, Helene got into a heated debate with Paul, my friend from high 
school who participated in the group interview. Paul was doing homework next to Helene and I, 
when he overheard Helene’s solution to immigration and how to preserve French culture. In 
Helene’s opinion, immigration should be completely stopped and the focus should be shifted onto 
developing the home countries of immigrants. Paul immediately started arguing with Helene, 
asking her to explain her plan to “fix” the immigration crisis and questioning the validity and 
viability of this plan. Helene defended her idea saying that direct intervention is needed in other 
countries in order for them to progress. The idea that direct intervention is needed can be traced 
back to colonialist discourse on how it was imperative that Europe colonized other nations in order 
to civilize and modernize these societies. The colonial project was also a racist project that 
perpetuated the racialization of Muslims, a fact which Helene ignores. Helene’s plan would stop 
immigration and allow France to keep its historically Christian culture while simultaneously 
pretending to aid others.  
In contrast to Helene, both Danielle and Amina (despite their geographical distance) held 
similar opinions on French identity and how the concept is dated and irrelevant. Amina specifically 




“They have no problem with European immigrants. When, you 
know, they can have different religions, they can have different 
beliefs. You meet someone from Sweden, very different from them, 
but they’re never going to be seen as a threat. And they’re never 
going to be asked to assimilate. But, when it comes to Arab people, 
suddenly they have to give up everything they have and be French, 
but what does it mean to be French? Most of them are born in 
France. They’re French. But those right-wing politics sometimes 
make it hard to identify to the French system. Because it’s this 
constant media propaganda that if you’re Muslim you’re not 
French.” 
 
In this quote, Amina critically brings up something that is discussed by many French 
scholars, the argument that Islam is inherently incompatible with French culture and therefore 
Muslims will never truly be seen as French (Silverstein 2018; Scott 2007; Parekh 2008). 
Assimilation as a concept would require Muslim immigrants to understand French republicanism 
and abide by its rules, thus conforming to the notion of a certain type of French identity. Broader 
French discourse, which pushes for immigrants to conform in this way results in the continuing 
discrimination against second or third generation immigrants who do not necessarily choose to 
integrate for various reasons. Thus, these populations are not accepted as French citizens despite 
their citizenship status. Often times, Muslim immigrants have to purposely construct their identity 
to fit within the framework of French republicanism, “yet in their interaction with whites, they 
experience discrimination and marginalization” (Beaman 2017, 68). Therefore, even if immigrants 
and their children may be legally French, they are not seen as culturally French. In order to be 
considered culturally French, one must share in the traditions, customs and history of France, 
which are rooted in the history of Christianity in Europe. This means that despite its intentions, 
secularism does not necessarily subsume equality between people of different religions. This 
specifically impacts Muslims, who, in order to integrate, have to participate in cultural practices 
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that are derived from Christianity. Other requirements to be considered “culturally” French include 
speaking the language perfectly, sharing a common history, and spending most of one’s life in 
France (Beaman 2017, 69). This ultimately ends up excluding a large swath of Muslims who are 
not considered truly French, despite the fact that huge amounts of second and third generation 
Muslims speak French fluently and have lived in France their entire lives. Despite this, it is easy 
to pinpoint these already marginalized populations as being affected by the traditional notion of 
French identity. 
Only Amina expresses an opinion that is not talked about explicitly by any other 
interviewee. In her view, if you think you are French, you are French. She states: 
 
“I think you have French identity if you’re born in France. Or if you 
lived in France long enough and you actually want the identity. You 
live your life day to day in France and that’s it. I don’t, do we even 
need a French identity? I don’t think so. You know you can just live 
your life. And do you really need to identify with a group?” 
 
 
Here, Amina is talking about de facto assimilation and de facto Frenchness. Despite 
acknowledging that French identity can be claimed by anyone who wants to be French, Amina 
goes on to say that it is still necessary to abide by certain rules, including aspects of laïcité. 
Therefore, even though Amina understands French identity as fluid, she still recognizes the 
necessity of certain populations to conform to a certain extent. This tolerance of Muslims and 
immigrants in conjunction with the understanding that they need to assimilate to some extent is a 
commonly held opinion amongst my interviewees. Although these concepts are not necessarily 
paradoxical, there is tension between the desire for freedom of public expression of difference and 
the need to fit into wider French culture. Ultimately, “freedom is pitted against obligation, public 
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rights against private rules, tolerance against intolerance, modernity against tradition— with 
hegemonic secularism consistently failing to recognize its own traditions, impositions, and 
intolerances” (Silverstein 2018, 1344). French secularism fits into Silverstein’s explanation, as 
many are unaware of the immense cultural impact of Christianity on France as well as secularism’s 
underlying enlightenment philosophies that count as “tradition”, yet still create intolerances and 
exclusions. Many people understand the dichotomies as stated by Silverstein as an “either or” 
choice, as opposed to both being able to work in harmony. This dichotomized thinking makes it 
difficult for people who have multiple identities to be able to fit into French culture, which is seen 
as homogenous and grounded in a European-Christian history. 
Ultimately, of my informants, only Helene seemed to be passionate about the concept of 
French identity. In contrast, most of the interviewees seemed to agree that Muslim immigrant 
populations should be assimilated, most often by compartmentalizing their cultural heritage, and 
while this is not directly related to the notion of French identity, it may hint at the desire for as 
much continuity amongst the French population as possible. There seems to be an overarching 
desire for an all-encompassing common ground, which can be seen through my interviewees 
affinity for French republicanism and laïcité.  
2.1.3  Assimilation: How should Muslims be incorporated into France? 
Should various immigrant communities in France assimilate into wider French culture? 
The way in which assimilation is promoted by dominant French discourse, “builds on a type of 
republican individualism, which seeks to assimilate individuals who become citizens through a 
‘political choice’” (Jouili 2015). This question of assimilation came up multiple times during my 
interviews. Throughout my time with French students, this question took on a new form and 
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transformed from ‘should Muslim immigrants be assimilated’ to ‘how should Muslim immigrants 
be assimilated?’ In one of my first interviews, Christine uses her personal experience as half-
Vietnamese to explain her complex understanding of this issue. 
From the first moment I sat down at the kitchen table for my group interview, Christine 
was bright-eyed, alert and engaged. Although she was busy with her schoolwork, she made time 
to sit with me and her friends to talk about their perspectives and experiences. Christine was 
specifically very open about her background throughout the interview, which is important to know 
in order to contextualize her viewpoints. Christine’s mother is Vietnamese and while Christine 
wants to keep learning about her heritage, growing up, her mother continuously made sure 
Christine understood French culture, including French Catholicism. Christine’s mother does not 
believe in God, but would urge Christine and her sister to learn about Catholicism because they 
lived in Western Europe. Her mother knew the best way for her to fit in was to understand, as 
Christine puts it, “old French conservative culture.” Christine admits that by learning about 
Catholicism, she was better able to understand French culture. 
Her mother’s desire for Christine to fit in with French culture is one reason why she 
attended a private Catholic high school in the south of France. Despite spending time absorbing 
French culture, Christine still tries to actively learn about her Vietnamese heritage. As she 
understands it, religion is the most convenient way to connect to your roots. Although balancing 
these two realities may be difficult, Christine talks about navigating cultures with ease, even 
though this is not always the case. In fact, Christine states: 
 
“I’ve had people ask me ‘oh, does your mom speak French?’ When 
she arrives. Because she’s Vietnamese, so she looks Asian. ‘Does 
your mom speak French?’ And I’m like yeah, duh. I can’t speak 
Vietnamese, what language do you think we speak together?” 
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She goes on to say: 
 
“She’s the only person in the family who married a French guy so 
I’m half Vietnamese. All her sisters and brothers married other 
Asian people, so when we’re with my cousins, depending on if I’m 
standing by my mom or my sisters, or if my cousins are standing 
beside us, you can see the way people look which is very different. 
When they see my sisters or me, we look more French. We don’t 
look more Asian, so she feels more integrated. She speaks French.” 
 
It is evident from this anecdote that a certain level of assimilation helps Christine’s mother 
to feel more “French.” By speaking French and learning about French culture from her mother, 
Christine was able to more easily assimilate into French society.  
As discussed previously, when it became clear that Muslim immigrants who migrated 
during the 20th century were in France to stay, it became a goal of many to promote their 
assimilation, while others wanted these immigrants to return to their respective home countries. 
Despite this, much of the immigrant population from Western and Northern Africa decided to stay 
in France. In order to fit into wider French culture, many of these immigrants decided to 
compartmentalize their cultural differences into their private lives. Some immigrants even stopped 
practicing their religion as well as further separated themselves from their home culture by 
speaking French and teaching their children only French cultural norms. This was indeed the case 
for Amina. 
Amina’s approach to assimilation is founded in her personal experience of not having any 
connection to her Moroccan roots, despite being half-Arab. She has seen this loss of heritage first-
hand and believes that now, in general, parents are making more of an effort to pass on their culture 
to their children. Amina is not alone in the belief that immigrants and their offspring should not be 
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made to forget their culture in order to assimilate and fit into wider French society. Multiple 
interviewees recognize this complex nature of assimilation and expressed this in their interviews. 
They understand that while it is a reality that there are many separate Muslim communities in 
France, these communities did not necessarily choose to be isolationist of their own volition. 
External factors, including policies by the French government, have forced these populations to 
separate themselves. Christine personally understands this reality and compares it to the United 
States when she states:  
 
“The American way of integration is more like a melting pot, you 
bring your own culture. In France, you really have to leave your 
culture back. You have to fit inside the pieces and it’s really, really 
tough and when you finally fit inside the pieces, you have forgotten 
where you come from.” 
 
Christine is saying that in France you have to compartmentalize your different identities in 
an effort to assimilate, but this often leads to the forgetting of certain aspects of oneself. Many 
interviewees share a similar understanding of the loss of cultural identity while simultaneously 
arguing for a certain level of assimilation. This is one reason why many children and grandchildren 
of immigrants are, in fact, very culturally French, aren’t fluent in their parents native language, 
and do not feel any patriotic attachment to their home countries (Silverstein 2018). Often times, 
many second and third generation immigrants oscillate between wanting to know and understand 
their heritage while also navigating acceptance into French society. This idea is recognized by 
Christine who states that many second or third generation immigrants, including herself, try to find 
different ways to connect to their heritage, which most often includes religion. She states: 
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“They [2nd and 3rd generation immigrants] don’t know the place 
they come from, or if they’ve never been there, or don’t really speak 
the language. The only thing they can find often that really links 
them is religion.” 
 
Religion then becomes a way for both immigrants and their children to remain connected 
to their heritage. Yet, from the perspective of the republican assimilationist model, Muslim 
immigrants and their children are seen as people who “refuse” to assimilate because of their desire 
to practice their religion. This idea is reiterated in various ways by some of my informants who 
believe that Muslims can still practice their religion and simultaneously assimilate into French 
culture.  
The idea that the French Muslim population should assimilate by keeping their religious 
practices private is not uncommon. Jean, the student at the military-engineering university, iterates 
the idea that steps must be taken in order to avoid segregation between communities. In order to 
avoid segregation, communities must actively try to “mix in well.” He goes on to say:  
 
“In France, it is not a question of color or origins, it’s just your 
culture. If you reject French culture people won’t be nice to you. 
You can be whatever color, whatever race. If you have lived in 
France all of your life and you understand how it works, there is no 
problem at all.” 
 
As Jean points out, as long as you understand French culture, such as the French republican 
ideal of laïcité, you will not have a problem. He specifically uses the phrasing to “mix in well” 
which is an English translation of the French concept mixité sociale. This concept promotes the 
idea of social mixing, which assumes that an individual will have more opportunities for social 
mobility if they mix with people of different social classes, participating in the ideal French 
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republican model (Sabeg & Xuan 2006). While Jean promotes the idea of mixité, he ignores the 
social reality for Muslim populations.  
In fact, Muslims who do not neatly fit into the role of French citizen, face discrimination 
based on their actions. This is because Muslim and black migrants and their descendants are seen 
as “mobilizers of cultural and religious values fundamentally deemed incompatible with French 
secular, liberal norms. (Silverstein 2018, location 700). Therefore, Muslim populations are seen as 
separate communities which are unable to assimilate. In general, it is seen as a good goal by many 
French pundits to rid France of “Communalism” or communautarisme, a term deployed in media 
and political discourse to suggest a tendency for Muslim French and other immigrant populations 
to congregate in “enclaves” with their own community values (Silverstein 2018). By doing this, 
France can achieve its goal of having all citizens seen as simply French as opposed to any other 
hyphenated identity. Being French is more important than any visible markers of difference 
(Beaman 2017). Despite this desire to have a homogenous French label, French citizens are seen 
as living “side by side” instead of “living together” (Bowen 2011, 33). As various political actors 
state, living together would improve conditions for immigrant and Muslim communities. In fact, 
“in 2010 Interior Minister Claude Guéant said that high unemployment among those who come to 
France from outside the European Union proves ‘the failure of communalisms’ because those 
immigrants tend to clump together by culture and doing so keeps them from getting jobs” (Bowen 
2011, 33). In this statement, Guéant shows how the culture of Muslims has been problematized 
instead of the focus remaining on the socio-economic issues that they face.  
Ultimately, the idea that separate communities are bad for both immigrants socially and 
politically is consistently spread by politicians, despite the lack of ideas for how to actually 
economically integrate marginalized populations. Although there is a lack of concrete policies to 
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tackle what is perceived as communalism, some of my interviewees still believe that it is important 
for secluded communities to make a personal effort to assimilate. In this way, some interviewees 
seem to prioritize, in quite neoliberal fashion, personal initiative over structural policies that would 
tackle the socio-economic issues faced by Muslim and immigrant populations.  
Ariane, who is pro-assimilation, understands that it is important to keep your own culture 
while simultaneously adjusting to life in France. She states: 
 
“I think that you can live with your own culture within another frame 
and I think that the French laïcité is good. I like this model. 
Sometimes people are thinking that it’s tough and that it’s a way to 
erase the culture of the immigrants, but you can still have your 
culture and adopt to some codes and I’m ok with these codes, 
because I still want the laïcité to apply to the Catholic church.” 
 
Ariane uses the concept of laïcité to express why it is crucial for immigrants to assimilate. 
She also makes clear that some parts of cultural heritage are more acceptable than others (i.e. food 
and music), while others must be hidden away (religion). By assimilating, immigrants show that 
they recognize the importance of laïcité to the French Republic and its citizens. By publicly 
expressing their religious beliefs and living in separate communities, which were created by 
segregating housing policies, immigrant communities are interacting with the French Republic in 
a way that is different from many other French citizens. This often becomes a point of tension and 
is expressed in some of Ariane’s and Jean’s sentiments.  
As more Muslims began to move into Europe in the 20th century, adopting mainstream 
French cultural norms and codes then became a necessary aspect of assimilation. Not only was 
becoming laïque important, but also the idea of ridding Muslims of their history and traditions in 
order to fit into wider French society. Ultimately, it became a goal of France to assimilate Muslim 
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immigrants. While this has been a long-standing goal, it has become clear that separate 
communities still exist and are not so easily integrated, of no fault of their own. These separate 
communities, which often end up living in the suburbs or banlieues, will be discussed in a 
following chapter.  
It cannot be concluded from these interviews how being a second or third generation 
Muslim effects one’s opinion on assimilation. Both Christine and Amina come from mixed ethnic 
backgrounds and talk negatively about certain aspects of assimilation, especially the loss of 
cultural heritage. In contrast, Ariane, whose father is from Northern Africa and therefore is also of 
mixed heritage, has different opinions about assimilation. In her view, you can simultaneously 
hold onto your culture, that is certain legitimate aspects of culture, and fit within the framework of 
the French Republic. In general, the other interviewees tend to agree that assimilation is important, 
although some are more hesitant about how immigrants should be assimilated.  
From these interviews, there seems to be a general consensus that Muslims should be 
assimilated in some way in order to fit into French society. To what extent they should be 
assimilated was a more difficult question for my interlocutors to answer. Ultimately, even the most 
seemingly assimilated people still face discrimination. This is seen in the case of Christine’s 
mother who is often impacted by racist attitudes, including when she went to go vote in the 2017 
French presidential election. At the voting poll, Christine’s mother had an issue with her 
registration and suddenly, out of nowhere, a man walked up to her and yelled, “you’re foreign, you 
shouldn’t have the right to vote.” According to Christine, her mother screamed at the man in 
response, but this type of othering is not uncommon. Christine’s mother is the perfect example of 
an assimilated non-European migrant, yet she is still impacted by exclusionary racist mechanisms 
that are a part of the French imaginary. This again exemplifies how French identity gets tied to 
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racial identity, thus permanently excluding those who have different religious and racial 
subjectivities.  
 
2.1.4  Muslim Women and the Hijab in France 
The expectations around assimilation can also be revealed in the debates specifically 
surrounding Muslim women and headscarves in France. The status of the Muslim woman and her 
agency has been a topic of interest in the French imaginary for almost two centuries, nourished by 
particular Orientalist ideas about Muslim societies (Said 1979). France particularly became 
interested in the “sexual” and “exotic” nature of oriental societies (Scott 2007). As France began 
its colonization process, part of the spoils of war and conquering were not only money, but native 
women. Muslim women were seen as objects of desire and the veil was a barrier to the right of 
Western men to view these women. The visibility of Muslim women became an assault on male 
sexuality and their right to access female populations. Not only did veiling give Muslim women 
some sense of power over their sexuality, it also allowed them to move through various public 
spaces despite fantasies of colonial domination (Scott 2007, 160). Instead of recognizing the 
potential agency provided by the veil, French populations insisted on emancipating Muslim 
women from their “oppressive” societies. Therefore, the visibility of the body became a sign of 
emancipation (Scott 2007, 155). The various meanings of the hijab, as attributed by dominant 
French discourses, haven’t changed much since France’s colonial history and have only become 
more complex with France’s increasingly visible religious Muslim population. 
Since 1989, there have been many debates surrounding the Muslim headscarf and it’s place 
in French culture. A key moment in regards to these debates was the “headscarf ban” of the early 
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2000s, a colloquial term for the banning of “conspicuous religious symbols” in public schools, 
which were particularly targeted at headscarves. This was the first time that a law was implemented 
to outlaw Muslim garments in France. I argue that the way in which the hijab has been used as a 
political tool by both sides of the political spectrum in France has disenfranchised Muslim 
populations and ultimately paints Muslim women as both lacking agency and as active agents of 
political Islam. This can be seen in the discourses that utilize certain feminist arguments 
surrounding the hijab, the face-veil and the most recent debate over the burkini, a modest swim 
suit worn by headscarf wearing women.  
In order to discuss the intricacies of the situation of Muslim women in France, it is 
necessary to understand the specific French context in which they find themselves. Muslim women 
who veil are often ostracized because they are seen as refusing to integrate into French society. 
Muslim women are further seen as “backward” and “traditional” if they choose to veil. 
Furthermore, while religious difference is supposedly tolerated, the French state consistently 
recognizes and prioritizes the rights of certain religious groups, such as Catholics, Protestants and 
Jews (Parekh 2006, 190). This results in a cultural context in which the government constructs a 
dominant tradition that is legitimate, which includes France’s very Catholic history. This pushes 
some Muslims to try to fit in by not expressing their religiosity publicly. Therefore, Muslims are 
often forced to adapt their cultural identity or religious convictions. Adapting Islam to the French 
context became especially important during the Islamic revival of the 1980s and 1990s, when there 
were increasing requests for mosques, halal food, and prayer spaces in workspaces. The revival 
was primarily aimed at Muslim immigrants in the hopes that these communities would be able to 
maintain their Islamic way of life “endangered by a gradual secularization of Muslims in Europe” 
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(Jouili 2015). The Islamic revival ultimately brought religion into the public sphere in a way that 
was different from previous generations.  
Furthermore, other Muslims who express their religiosity publicly are rejected by larger 
society, despite their desire to be a part of French society. The veil in particular becomes a 
representation of the wider Muslim population in general and has sparked passionate public 
debates as well as codified laws. A common argument against Muslim women who veil is the 
understanding (or misunderstanding), that the hijab is oppressive in nature. This is best represented 
by the interviewees in my study, on both the left and right sides of the political spectrum, who 
argued against the hijab in public spaces for self-proclaimed feminist reasons.  
The subject of the hijab was an especially sensitive topic in the group interview. In the 
beginning of the interview, after I explained the premise of my research, I asked my interviewees 
about the recent incident involving Maryam Pougetoux, as mentioned earlier. Ariane joined the 
conversation quickly and stated: 
 
“This kind of reaction…can come from both sides of the 
political landscape. From the right because people are like, 
‘she’s Muslim and she’s wearing a hijab so this is not 
possible because if she wants to be French, she has to 
endorse the values of France whether that is to say laïcité or 
Catholicism. But there is also a trend on the left side, that is 
to say that she’s fighting for freedom, equality, and things 
like that and she cannot do it with a hijab on her head, 
because hijab is basically the opposite of freedom.” 
  
Christine elaborated on this point by describing how the political right views the hijab as 
an instrument of oppression, but in France it can’t necessarily be considered an instrument of 
oppression, at least not in the same way. Ariane solidifies her viewpoint when she says that 
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personally, she thinks that anything that a woman has to do, that a man doesn’t, is a form of 
oppression. She goes on to say that there are two cases in regards to the hijab, 
 
“The case where you have to do it, someone tells you to do 
it or you have to do it to be integrated into your family and 
community. And there’s another case where you choose it, 
you are free to choose it. But it is not because you are free to 
choose that you are not alienating anyone.” 
  
 In this understanding, a Muslim woman is either forced to wear a hijab or has chosen to 
wear a hijab, but then has willingly alienated herself from society at large. Christine quickly agreed 
that a hijab-wearing Muslim woman is excluding herself from larger French society, no matter her 
intentions. In her words, “it is not integration.” It is in opposition to French republicanism to 
embody one’s religion in the public sphere, such as wearing a hijab in a public space. Despite 
French Muslim women’s best efforts to style and make fashion-statements with their hijabs, a 
sense of oppression still remains. When I asked about the new availability of hijabs in popular 
clothing stores in America and Europe, Ariane responded that the hijab is never about fashion. The 
implication was that no matter how much one may dress up their hijab, it is still a symbol of 
oppression. Interesting enough, although fashionable hijabs are seen as dressing up something that 
is oppressive, the contrary, such as women who are scantily clad, is rarely seen as a problem. 
Ariane argued about this with Christine, saying that it is different to wear something recognized 
by society as a sign of vanity, such as high heels, and wearing something to hide you from someone 
else’s gaze. This resonates with Joan Scott’s point, according to which Western feminists believe 
in the innate desire of women for emancipation in Western terms, meaning an openness to sexuality 
and desirability or the freedom to take agency over one’s sexuality (2007). This idea that the hijab 
is inherently oppressive, as stated by Ariane, is based on its “purpose” to hide oneself from the 
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look of the man and to not entice his desire. Both Ariane and Christine are coming from admittedly 
leftist backgrounds, but understand the hijab as an object that can be oppressive in nature. In this 
case, it is unperceivable for these interlocutors that the Muslim women in question could be in 
control of their decision to wear a hijab. 
Furthermore, other left-leaning and center interviewees also shared similar sentiments 
about the hijab being oppressive. When discussing the hijab with Jean, he mentioned that he never 
sees them on his campus unless someone is visiting from the outside. He clarified that this is likely 
because the university is a military school so there is a lack of girls. The hijab would be considered 
a violation of the uniform because it is not compatible. Although Jean did not clarify his political 
position, he made clear of his belief that even people in the center do not like hijabs because of its 
association with the oppression of women. He goes on to quickly clarify, 
  
“I wouldn’t say, for most people it’s not a racist thing. Yes, 
it’s really associated with women’s repression and in France 
we are really against women’s oppression.” 
  
Here, Jean is ignoring histories of racism and supremacy and Muslim women’s specific 
positionality within these histories (Scott 2007). This falls in line with dominant French discourse 
which promotes a “color-blind” ideology in which race is not recognized. Thus, despite Jean’s 
claim that it is not racist to oppose the veil, he ignores the wider histories that have racialized 
Muslim women and the act of the wearing the veil itself.  
To further understand Jean’s reasoning, I asked about the agency of Muslim women and if 
they ever truly have a choice to wear a hijab. Similar to other interviewees, Jean reassures me that 
while Muslim women in France are in a good environment to be able to choose, he is still not sure 
if this is the case, especially because he is not familiar with anyone in the Muslim community. 
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This is similar to other interviewees who hold strong opinions about the French-Muslim 
community, but lack much direct experience with them. This is common among many of the 
interviewees, who all have varied opinions, but none of whom brought up personal opinions and 
experiences of Muslims. Jean argues that in his school there are no attitudes of xenophobia because 
everyone there is “educated and open-minded.” This reflects ideas of a middle-class superiority, a 
group who is automatically deemed open-minded and is widely seen in a positive light. Although 
his school is open-minded, he states that some women from “lower-classes” may not necessarily 
get a choice to veil. With this classist distinction, Jean is constructing his argument within a wider 
French framework. Furthermore, thinking within the framework of class is a privilege that people 
of color are not necessarily afforded. This privilege allows Jean to dismiss the true racial reasons 
behind why there are not many Arab students at his school.  
In general, education is often associated with becoming more modern, liberal, and secular. 
Therefore, if a woman happens to be more religious, and expresses this religiosity by wearing a 
hijab, she may automatically be considered less educated, less liberal, and less secular. 
Ultimately, there has been a lot of variance in public opinion surrounding Muslim women’s 
agency and the headscarf bans. In spite of significant opposition to the headscarf ban, a majority 
of public actors, especially self-proclaimed feminists, were forcefully in favor of the law (Teeple 
Hopkins 2015). Despite divergent perspectives, rarely is the reality of Muslim women and the 
issues they face given any space in these discussions. As Nadia Fadil describes in her article Not 
Unveiling as an Ethical Practice, many Muslim women recognize that obedience to religious rules 
should be a result of one’s personal convictions. In this interpretation, Muslim women understand 
that the hijab is a matter of personal choice, despite what popular opinion says. Furthermore, many 
of the women in Fadil’s article believe that wearing the hijab is a religious obligation, but there is 
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also a sense of freedom in the act of personally choosing to wear it (2011). Similarly, in Jeanette 
Jouili’s (2015) work, she uses her ethnographic research to argue that many women struggle in 
choosing whether or not to veil. This kind of internal struggle was not mentioned by any of my 
interviewees because it is a particular narrative that is left out of popular discourse. Many of 
Jouili’s interlocutors recognized the agency of other Muslim women and respected where other 
Muslim women were in their personal veiling journey. Despite this, my interviewees focus on 
whether or not the hijab itself is oppressive and if it can fit into the French public sphere. 
In public discourse, Muslim women are painted as both having no choice and as active 
agents of political resistance. This is done in fear of political Islam which is seen as a rejection of 
the French political model because of a refusal to assimilate. These two popular portrayals of 
Muslim women are technically incompatible but are widespread in France. In fact, “the refusal to 
accommodate the assimilation model raises the issue that Muslims have generally demonstrated 
an unwillingness to integrate into French society” (Mazher 2005). This understanding of Muslims 
as unwilling to integrate by wearing the hijab was also a common theme with some of my 
interviewees. Multiple interviewees brought up the wearing of a hijab as a form of protest. How 
can the hijab be both an instrument of oppression and a way to show one’s resistance? In regards 
to the hijab as an agent of resistance, Jean stated, 
 
“It’s also that it’s associated with the fact that certain groups 
of people don’t want to fit in. It’s kind of a way to say that 
they don’t want to fit in the culture of France.” 
  
Jean explains that it may be the case that some Muslim women don’t want to fit in or 
assimilate into French society. By wearing a hijab, Muslim women are sometimes unknowingly 
engaging in what other French citizens may consider a rejection of French ideals.  
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This issue was also brought up in the context of the burkini debate that arose during my 
group interview. The burkini, otherwise known as a modest bathing suit that Muslim women can 
wear, caused waves of controversy throughout France when it was first introduced. Because the 
burka, a misnomer of the face veil, is not allowed in public spaces, the burkini was quickly banned 
on beaches by many small-town mayors during the summer of 2016, making Muslim women who 
wear the burkini seem “subversive and excessively religious” (Jung 2016). None of the 
interviewees commented on the viral photos of the women who were forced to unveil on the beach. 
Instead Ariane was quick to state her opinion on the issue of the burkini, saying how both the right 
and left-wing disliked the burkini, but for different reasons. Specifically she said, 
 
“The burkini phase was quite interesting because the far-
right started to yell about this burka on the beach and a part 
of the left-wing started to say ‘oh my god, we fought in ‘68 
in order to liberate women’. So, I’m from the left-wing. I’m 
not particularly Islamophobic, but don’t do it.” 
  
Ariane goes on to say, 
“If I was saying no burkini on the beach, it was like ‘oh my 
god you are so islamophobic’ and I am just like ‘no I am just 
for equality of women in general’ and they’re like ‘they can 
choose freely.” 
  
In these statements, Ariane is highlighting a common theme found in more typical liberal 
French thought. While, Ariane is against the hijab in public spaces in general, she emphasizes her 
personal feminist philosophy, which is shared by some of my other interviewees. According to 
this view, Muslim women can only become truly emancipated when they are able to rid themselves 
of the hijab or burka and fully assimilate into French society. In her statement, Ariane also 
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interestingly mixes up the terms burka and burkini, implying that she views the burkini as 
essentially the same as the burka, despite the actual look of the burkini.  
During this discussion, Christine also mentioned that at first, she did not understand the 
purpose of the burkini, because all of the suits she saw were tight and form-fitting. This confused 
her as she believed the purpose of the burkini was to hide the woman’s body. She goes on to say 
that these women could easily just wear a big t-shirt to cover-up, which would ultimately be easier 
because they wouldn’t be breaking any laws. In actuality, the woman who was forced to unveil 
during the 2016 controversy was not wearing a burkini but simply a blue tunic, black pants, and a 
headscarf. Ariane jumps in after Christine makes her point, emphasizing that the reason Muslim 
women want their bathing suit to look like a burka, is so that they can make a political statement. 
Despite this, Ariane focuses on the term burkini, assuming it implies that the woman is wearing a 
burka on the beach as opposed to a more fashionable bathing suit (as seen in highly circulated 
photographs). When hearing the term burkini, the French imaginary sees it as a political statement 
as opposed to a modern-day fashion choice for Muslim women. It is also important to note that 
Ariane assumes that the burkini and burka look similar, whereas Christine perceives the burkini as 
very tight, which is unlike other traditional covers. Christine’s understanding of the burkini is more 
in line with how the suit actually looked in the incident during summer of 2016. It is clear that 
both Ariane and Christine are confused about the issue and argue about the burkini and its place 
in modern, popular French fashion. Despite this, both Ariane and Christine still express their 
discontent with the burkini and how the situation has unraveled in France. 
Another student who participated in the group interview, Paul, spoke up for the first time 
during the interview in order to agree with Ariane. He brought up the fact that at the time of the 
2011 burka ban, many people started to wear burkas in order to support the wider Muslim 
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community. He also agreed with Ariane that this is the case for the Islamic scarf in general, people 
will wear it as a sign of solidarity with the French Muslim community. In this understanding, it is 
clear that the hijab is simultaneously an instrument of oppression as well as an instrument of 
resistance. My interviewees from both left and right-leaning parties discuss the hijab as oppressive, 
non-feminist, and anti-assimilation (which is confused with non-integration). 
Ultimately, while there is much divergence in opinion across France about the hijab 
(Teeple Hopkins 2015), much of the conversation doesn’t seem to take into account the actual 
opinions of Muslim women. Much of the issue surrounding the hijab involves the implication that 
the hijab is oppressive and therefore shouldn’t be allowed in public places because there is no way 
to ensure that the woman is making a personal choice. Many of the interviewees in my study share 
the sentiment that the hijab is oppressive and that if you do in fact choose to wear it, you are 
actively excluding yourself from French society. This common thought process does not take into 
account the actual lived experienced of Muslim women in France. As detailed by Nadia Fadil and 
Jeanette Jouili and many other scholars, the reality of religious Muslim women and their veiling 
practices is much more complicated and nuanced. The public discourse surrounding the hijab has 
ultimately presented Muslim women as a homogenous group. This affects Muslim women 
negatively because they are all painted in the same way, without acknowledgement given to their 
differences. The general discourse surrounding the hijab, as seen in mine and others works, also 
clearly shows Muslim women as oppressed when they choose to veil. Despite the fact that they 
are viewed without agency when they publically display their religion, they are also argued to be 
active agents of resistance. This is seen when Muslim women chose to wear either the burkini or 
other modest clothes on the beach. Overall, it is interesting to note how the racialization of Muslim 
women specifically has become a part of dominant French discourse, so much so that the veil is 
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understood in racist terms—either denoting excessive sexuality or a lack thereof. It is clear that 
this is the framework in which my interlocutors try to make sense of Muslim women in the French 
public sphere.   
  
2.1.5  Perspectives on the Banlieues 
The first person I interviewed during my research was Jacques, a film student who lived in 
my foyer during my study abroad experience. Jacques was adopted from Madagascar and grew up 
in a small village near Alsace where, in his high school, he was the only person of color. Jacques 
used to be more liberal in high school, but describes himself as more politically moderate after he 
spent some time in Canada. Jacques and I chose to talk in the communal kitchen area of the dorm, 
where it was noisy and loud, but where he would be more comfortable, as we had never met before. 
Unfortunately, I was not able to record the interview because of the noise level, but I took detailed 
notes as the conversation took place. Jacques opened up about his childhood when we began 
talking about assimilation. He told me that he grew up in a ZEP, an educational priority zone, 
which has benefited from additional state resources channeled into disadvantaged areas, especially 
in the banlieues —the French word for suburbs, intended to counteract the failing school systems 
there. He stated that where he grew up, there were a lot of delinquents, mugging, and crime because 
people feel “left over.” He added, “when you are abandoned by society, you build yourself by 
yourself.” He referred to the banlieues that he lived in as “almost like another country.” 
While banlieue is the French word for suburbs, there is a specific cultural and historical 
context tied to the word. In general, banlieues are areas of spatial isolation, immobility, and high 
unemployment rates (Silverstein 2018). While they were originally built for middle-class workers, 
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they now often house immigrants and their descendants, mainly people of color who are forced to 
live in poor living conditions due to various economic, political, and social factors. The banlieues 
are often depicted by media and political pundits as “lost areas of the Republic” and are described 
as lawless zones of migrants and their descendants who refuse to integrate into French society 
(Wolfreys 2017). In order to combat the seclusion and exclusion of immigrant populations, “state-
directed integration efforts have often taken the form of urbanization and urban reform policies 
that have targeted the ultra-modern housing projects (cités), built across the French urban 
periphery, and particularly in the Northern suburbs (banlieues) of Paris, that today suffer from 
high rates of unemployment, physical dilapidation, and crime” (Silverstein 2004, 78). These areas 
have also become increasingly known internationally for their high rates of crime and have actually 
been labeled “no-go zones” by the American media channel Fox News. This perpetuates the idea 
that banlieues are areas of danger and creates an association between people of color and Muslim 
immigrants and high rates of crime. The overarching view of banlieues effects how French citizens 
understand the people who live there, many of whom are Muslim and immigrants.  
Although originally none of my interview questions in my guide were aimed at tackling 
the issue of banlieues, this topic, because of its perceived connection to the French Muslim 
population, came up almost naturally amongst my interviewees. For example, in the group 
interview, we started talking about the banlieues when discussing how second and third generation 
immigrants often reclaim their roots through religion. This led to a discussion about integration 
and social mobility for immigrants, which is very limited in the banlieues. Christine was the first 
to explain to me that the suburbs were designed to be inaccessible and hard to get in or out, which 
explains the lack of adequate transportation. She goes on to physically describe the cités, which 
are large enclosed squares of cement buildings designed to be housing projects. Thomas jumped 
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into the conversation immediately after Christine, wanting to make clear that the cités were not 
originally built for immigrants, but for French people. Thomas may have mentioned this in order 
to counter the previous argument about housing segregation, asserting that the banlieues were not 
created to specifically segregate migrants. It is also interesting to note that Thomas emphasizes the 
distinction between immigrants and French people. While this may be due to Thomas’s English-
speaking skills, it also speaks to the delineation between immigrants and other French citizens. 
Despite the fact that the banlieues currently house many second and third generation immigrants 
who are French citizens, they are not necessarily recognized as truly French. Thomas goes on to 
say that the immigrants only moved into the banlieues after the working-class French citizens 
moved out. Immediately, Ariane jumps in and emphasizes that the cités were built to block the 
poor, a point that Thomas contests, stating that the working-class citizens were able to move out 
when they wanted to. This argument was brief, but emphasizes the tensions that exist surrounding 
the issue of the banlieues. In actuality, the banlieues were built after World War II because of a 
lack of adequate housing (Silverstein 2004). After World War II and again after the Algerian war, 
because of a lack of domestic workers, many immigrant populations were given incentive by the 
French government to settle and work in France. Most migrants were initially forced to settle in 
bidonvilles, or permanent shantytowns located on the peripheries of cities (Silverstein 2004). Over 
decades and well into the 1970s, migrants moved into the banlieues, which previously housed the 
working-class. When the housing situation in France began to improve, people who were better 
off economically moved out of the banlieues, leaving impoverished populations stuck in these 
urban peripheries.   
In general, the topic of the banlieues did not come up amongst all of my interviewees, but 
apart from the group interview, at least four interviewees mentioned the banlieues in some way. 
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They all understood that there are issues with the banlieues, although how these issues are 
understood varies greatly amongst the students. Two students, Jacques and Jean, both perceive the 
banlieues as dangerous areas, a stigma that has been attributed to them through widespread media 
coverage. This media coverage often emphasizes “cultural difference as the defining feature of 
racialized individuals” which enables the media and politicians to blame minorities for the 
“inability” to become “French” (Wolfreys 2017). Therefore, the dangerous aspects of the banlieues 
are blamed on inherent cultural differences as opposed to external factors which anger and frustrate 
minority populations.  
As mentioned earlier, Jacques’ opinion on banlieues is informed by his time spent in these 
areas, while Jean did not grow up in the banlieues. Jacques specifically recognizes that the 
banlieues often have more crime than other areas and that this crime is not random or inexplicable. 
In fact, the banlieues are often known for their lack of adequate facilities and transportation which 
further upsets and marginalizes the populations that live there. 
Jacques’ earlier statement that the residents of banlieues feel “abandoned” by society is 
shared by two other interviewees, Danielle and Amina, who both sympathize with the situation of 
immigrant-descendent populations who are “stuck” in these suburbs. Amina specifically states: 
 
“After the war when we asked for immigrants to come over to help 
us rebuild, we put them in the suburbs. We built buildings for them 
and stuff. And now it’s 2018 and they’re still there. So yeah they 
stick together because who are they going to stick with otherwise?”  
 
Amina recognizes the role of the French state in placing immigrants in isolated areas that 
lack any physical mobility. Amina goes on to say that while she understands there are some 
dangerous neighborhoods, the entirety of the banlieues should not be cast in such a negative light. 
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Danielle iterates a similar point, stating that while there are some dangerous areas, including areas 
with drug trafficking, you can still travel to the suburbs. She emphasizes that there are even some 
famous universities in the suburbs, including ENS, which is her university.  
In general, while the topic of the banlieues did not come up too much throughout my 
interviews, the points that were made by the interviewees say a lot about how the banlieues may 
currently be viewed by French students. Many universities, especially universities in the Paris 
region, are outside of the city in the suburbs. Thus some of the interviewees used their personal 
experience to explain that the suburbs, in totality, are not completely dangerous. While they 
understood that not every area of the suburbs is dangerous, only some interviewees brought up the 
plight of the people who live in these areas. The conversation ultimately focused on how my 
interlocutors have interacted with and perceive the banlieues as opposed to how current 
populations are affected. The interviewees only sometimes mentioned the conditions in which 
these populations are forced to live, recognizing that the lack of upward social and economic 
mobility as well as physical mobility to leave the banlieues.  
Furthermore, it is important to mention that those who are most outspoken about the 
inequalities in the suburbs, Jacques, Amina, Ariane and Danielle, have all spent time in the 
suburbs, either during their childhood or during their time in university. Therefore, it may be easier 
for these students to better understand the suburbs by seeing and living in them first-hand. Jacques 
and Ariane are the only two students to explicitly state that they spent their childhood in the 
suburbs, and both of them are very forward in their opinion on the marginalization of populations 
in the banlieues. Interestingly, Jacques’ and Ariane’s deep understanding of class-related issues of 
marginalization stands somehow opposed to their incapacity to grasp the negative influence of the 
cultural hegemony on immigrant-descendent populations as was exposed in previous sections. 
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This shows how even potentially left-leaning students are shaped by dominant French discourse 
specifically touted by French politicians. These political pundits have “cultivated a narrative that 
[have] racialized and stigmatized minorities” who find themselves denied access to common 
pathways to integration “held up as the very fabric of Republican opportunity” (Wolfreys 2017, 
131). Thus, even these students who criticize class-based discrimination are not capable to fully 
disrupt historical process of racialization of Muslim populations that attribute negative cultural 
and racial attributes to French Muslims, without recognizing the structural economic processes 
that truly limit their mobility.  
Furthermore, Thomas and Jean, although both living in the suburbs of Paris while attending 
university, are the only two students to be more wary of the banlieues. Thomas spent time arguing 
that the banlieues were not designed to block the poor and Jean, who is originally from 
Montpellier, stated: 
 
“And North and West of Montpellier, it’s like the middle-class 
suburbs with huge and ugly buildings and all people live together 
and you don’t go there by night by yourself, you know?” 
 
As Jean understands, in both Montpellier and Paris, there is not much that can be done 
about the segregation between the rich, who live in the inner city, and the poor, who are forced to 
live in the urban peripheries. In his comments, Jean focuses on the classist issues of the banlieues 
while ignoring the racial factors implicit in its social reality. Ultimately, despite many urban 
renewal programs, it is understood by many of my interviewees that the situation in the banlieues 
has not at all improved. This became evident in the 2005 race riots which began after a case of 
lethal police brutality in the Parisian banlieues. More specifically, the riots occurred in October 
and November of 2005, during which thousands of young people from the banlieues participated 
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in an urban uprising after the deaths of two teenagers who were electrocuted while hiding from 
police in Clichy-Sous-Bois (Wolfreys 2017). The riots were mostly amongst ethnic minority youth 
and it “exposed a racism that scores deep into the French nation” (Murray 2006). A mix of police 
brutality, poor living conditions, and discrimination all exploded during the race riots, which 
ultimately showed the tensions that exist between the banlieues and the rest of France. Overall, 
this event sparked controversy, but not much has changed in the 13 years that have followed. While 
young people may be less fearful to venture into the banlieues, as seen with some of my 
interviewees, the banlieues are still recognized as a problem. They are problem due to the 
separation of immigrants from the wider French population and because of the dilapidating 
conditions that continue to affect those who live there. Those who have lived in the banlieues 
understand that the marginalized should not necessarily be blamed for their living conditions. 
Those who have not spent much time in the banlieues are skeptical and are more inclined to blame 
individual prerogative. What can be understood is that the way in which the media portrays the 
banlieues has an uneven effect on how the suburbs are perceived by various populations and one’s 
personal experience with the banlieues plays a large role in how one views the suburbs.  
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3.0 Conclusion 
Ultimately, although the scope of my research is limited in number, I believe that my 
study provides valuable insight into French college students and their opinions on laïcité and 
Muslims in France. At the beginning of my study, I went in with various preconceived notions 
about what French college students think about Islam and laïcité in France. Originally, I believed 
that these students would be more liberal and progressive, ideologies which are sometimes seen 
as a given with younger generations, especially college students, at least in America. Throughout 
my stay in Paris and time spent with French college students, my understanding of them began to 
change. I started to think in terms of traditionalism, assuming that maybe French college students 
were more influenced by dominant French discourses than I originally thought. This was based 
on my initial interviews, where interviewees held views consistent with dominant discourses 
founded in French republicanism. As time went on and I began to thoroughly analyze my data, I 
realized that the variance between students on different sides of the political spectrum was not 
drastic and fit within the wider frame of French republicanism. 
In general, my interlocutors understandings of Islam and laïcité seem to be shaped by 
dominant French discourse, which ultimately structures how most of the students think, even if 
they consider themselves “leftist.” Through my analysis of various topics, I came to realize that 
while there is variance amongst French college students, this variance fits into the wider 
framework that the dominant French narrative provides. For example, when I talked with my 
interviewees about French identity as a concept, there was a lot of variety in how people 
discussed this notion of identity. Christianity was always brought up in terms of situating 
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identity, even if the student disagreed with its inextricable tie to French identity. The concept of 
French identity was also brought up in relation to the French-Muslim population and their 
current situation in France. Some students recognized that citizens of Arab descent are treated 
differently and are often assumed to be foreign-born. Some of the interviewees have also had 
personal experiences where they or their family members were perceived as other because they 
did not fit the description of what a French person should look like. These viewpoints are 
counteracted by others who maintained a typical right-wing argument, that France should not 
give up its roots and that France’s cultural identity is currently under attack. Muslim difference 
seems to be a consistent problem within secular France and to my interlocutors. Even the more 
liberal students, who potentially understand the marginalization of Muslim populations, are 
shaped by dominant French discourse and have trouble dismissing essential French concepts 
such as laïcité, which caused them to see certain religious or cultural practices as at least 
partially responsible for their predicament. 
The students’ opinions only became more varied in the discussion about the French-
Muslim population. When talking about assimilation, the students are unsure about how Muslims 
should be assimilated. There is no consensus on what should be done or how, but, despite this, 
the students’ understandings about assimilation fits into the pro-assimilation ideal of French 
republicanism. Furthermore, when talking about the hijab and the agency of Muslim women, 
there are trends within the students’ responses that indicate the prominence of dominant French 
discourse, which is why the majority of the interviewees are clearly hesitant about allowing the 
hijab in various public places and public schools in particular. This again shows that even more 
liberal students are still impacted by the dominant French framework. 
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       As stated before, while one would assume that students have been raised in a time of de-
facto racial and religious pluralism, especially in urban areas, some have no direct contact with 
Muslim populations and there is still a common sense of a “problem” that needs to be solved 
within the French-Muslim community. Overall, throughout my interviews it becomes clear that 
the racialization of Muslims has become such a large part of dominant French discourse that 
some of my interlocutors reiterate ideas that are founded in the historical processes of racializing 
Muslim populations. Many of these young students, who are even admittedly “leftist” and well-
meaning, rationalize racist exclusions of Muslims in a typical French “color-blind” fashion. 
Again, even as leftists, it is hard for these young students to dismantle racial hierarchies and 
forms of domination and, therefore, they use culturalist language, which ultimately attributes 
responsibility to individual Muslims for their fate. No matter how they understand issues facing 
the Muslim community, these students are still re-articulating broader French discursive trends 
and framing the discussion within the wider framework of French republicanism. In this way, 
these students show that they are a part of an epistemic community, as they share a common 
understanding of laïcité and French republicanism and the symbols embedded within these 
structures.  
This study was my first time being a primary investigator conducting ethnographic 
research to this extent. While the study was fascinating and yielded some interesting results, 
there are some things I would change that may have made my research stronger. In regard to 
research design, I would have increased the number of participants in my study in order to obtain 
theme saturation in my interviews. I also would have spent more time engaged in participant 
observation with students and taking active notes. In order to enhance my study, I would have 
included more qualitative research while I was in France. This could have been done by handing 
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out surveys to all the students I had met over the course of my time in Paris. This would have 
resulted in more data to analyze salient themes and to see if there were, in fact, more consistent 
trends amongst students. Ultimately, I believe that if my research had more in-depth interviews 
with French college students, more themes would have emerged and I would have been able to 
come to a well-supported and stronger conclusion. 
Again, while my research cannot be generalized to any wider populations due to a lack of 
participants, I still recognize the importance in studying youth and their opinions on these topics. 
In general, while there has been a great deal of research on the French population and their views 
towards Muslims as well as ethnographies on French Muslim populations, there hasn’t been 
much research on non-Muslim French college students. My ethnography fits into a wider field 
which seeks to understand the current situation of the French Muslim population and how and 
why they have been marginalized. Hopefully, my study can provide some explanation or 
background as to why majority populations continue to have certain understandings about Islam. 
Because my study was conducted with college students, my research may be able to help other 
researchers conduct similar studies about French youth.  
Ultimately, my research is filling in a gap in the literature, which still lacks ethnographic 
studies on French college students. I believe that this study provides an avenue for potential 
future research within the realm of Postcolonial France. I personally would like to conduct future 
research within a similar avenue of study. I believe that future research could involve conducting 
a wider and more comprehensive study with French college students in order to fill any gap of 
information in my study. More specifically, an ethnographic study could be conducted on a 
French university campus with a large Muslim and non-Muslim population. By using interviews 
and participant observation, I could study what cohabitation looks like, how different students 
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interact or don’t interact, what spaces they share, what spaces are separate, and if there are any 
communal tensions. This could provide even more insight into how Muslim and non-Muslim 
students interact in their daily lives, trends which may permeate larger French culture. 
Conducting this study may reveal how the racialization and marginalization of Muslim 
populations is perceived by both Muslim and non-Muslim students who interact on a daily basis.  
Ultimately, throughout my research it has become clear that young students have been 
greatly shaped by contemporary French discourse and understandings of laïcité. With 
increasingly widespread global Islamophobia, it is important to question how these sentiments 
become globalized. In the case of France, current Islamophobia is tied not only to the country’s 
colonial history and racializing of its subsequent Muslim citizens but also to the specific 
exclusivist articulations of republicanism and secularism. France is not the only nation that has 
racialized Muslims causing their religious and cultural identities to become intertwined and seen 
as unchangeable. Nations in both the Eastern and Western hemisphere fall victim to appealing to 
normality and tradition in order to maintain the status quo, which ultimately negatively affects 
Muslims who are seen as an outside force of change. The status quo can often ignore those who 
are most marginalized, including racialized Muslim communities. As Van Houtum states, these 
liberal governments often times ask people to conform to the social expectations of either an 
oppressive majority or an authoritarian minority and that “such a government might be 
dismissing legality in favour of the tyranny of tradition such as religion” (2017, 88). Houtum is 
warning against appeals towards normalcy as recent developments show that many liberal 
governments have made a turn towards illiberalism. This is ultimately the case for many 
countries around the world, who often times impose their majoritarian cultural norms onto 
Muslim and other minority populations. Ultimately, it is difficult to know how to effectively 
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refashion dominant discourse when it is harmful to marginalized populations, but understanding 
the context in which Muslims have become racialized and subsequently discriminated against 






Appendix A  
1. What are your feelings about the different political parties in France today? 
2. What do you feel about the recent influx of immigrants in France? 
3. What does laïcité mean to you?  
4. Do you think college has had an effect on your political views? 
a. If yes, how so? 
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